ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Since 1994, Network Centric Warfare concepts have been tested through simulations, exercises and analysis and have shown to significantly improve multCwarfare operations through enhanced situational awareness throughout the chain of command of a deployed fighting force [I] . In 1999, the Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies U.S. Government work not protected by U.S. copyright.
Group (SSG) developed a concept called ForceNet, a naval component of the global DoD network called Global Grid, which provides a multi-domain, tiered network architectures of sensors, command and control, weapon systems and communication nodes extending these services from sea to space. A requirement of ForceNet is to have reakime menstruated and information disseminated throughout this global network. The Expeditionary Command and Control, Communications, Computers and Combat Systems Grid (EC5G) implement the concepts of ForceNet through transition into operations. ECSG provides to remotely deployed forces access on this global network. Reference [2], ECSG Master Plan, identifies nine end-to-end capabilities of ECSG. A significant objective is to merge two major networks (Joint Planning and Data Networks) to enhance situation awareness throughout the Battle Group. This feat signifies a major step toward a major objective of network centric warfare which Information Superiority. Merging networks of this sort will enhance the speed of command and information dissemination through the capability to plan and command seamless over one network and network enhancements such as Quality of Service (QoS) and multilevel security [2] .
Merging the two networks will migrate tactical information (Tactical Data Links) into a network that will have a variety of network services such as QoS to voice, data and video applications. In addition, general convergence of applications creates advantages such as improve bandwidth utilization by allowing applications access to underutilized networks, reduces maintenance cost due to having one network infrastructure and access to leading edge network technology. As such, experiments and analysis are in progress to study the impact of moving tactical data links to IF'-QoS networks. lPQoS provides applications with stringent bandwidth or latency guarantees over the current IP data networks, which provides "best effort" services (no guarantees of service).
IP-QoS provides guarantee performance bounds on latency and accuracy for message data. QoS services are deployed in two methods -Integrated and Differential Services.
-2-. IP QoS implementations do offer a solution that permits tactical messages to be received within required time boundaries. However they do not guarantee delivery of these messages m sequential order. This is a significant fault. Current implementations of JDN traffic over the TADILs guarantee that messages will be received in order, or not at all. As a result, tactical host terminals and processors are currently ill-equipped to handle message sequence errors.
The goal of this study is to gain a better understanding of the conditions under which messages may be received out of order in proposed TADIL-over-ADNS configurations, and to offer suggestions and recommendations for areas that require further investigation. This study focuses on the use of Modeling and Simulation (M&S) to construct highfidelity network models and test them under varying configurations and conditions. M&S provides an inexpensive and reliable method for planning and testing systems and configurations before actual deployment.
Message Ordering Vulnerability Studies
Thls study highlights four areas where proposed TADILover-ADNS implantations are vulnerable to message sequence errors. It is not intended to identify all potential problem areas. Simulation studies and discussions of their results are in the sections that follow. Overall conclusions and recommendations are discussed in Section 3.
3.

ADNS OSPF Link Selection
One of the key features of ADNS is its ability to dynamically manage different Satellite Communications (SATCOM) resources. A ship with several SATCOM reachback options, such as Challenge Athena (CA), Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS), and MilStar, would utilize ADNS to select the best link for forwarding 1P traffic on and off the ship. ADNS currently implements the commercial Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) routing protocol in order to select optimal route paths. One of the shortcomings of using a dynamic routing protocol such as OSPF is that end-to-end paths may change over time to include links of different channel characteristics. The instant an end-to-end path is changed, there is a possibility that the new best path may be much faster than the previously selected path. When a new faster path is selected, any packets that are en route over the old path may be passed by packets traveling on the new path, causing sequence errors. It is important to note that this may occur regardless of QoS Per Hop Behaviors (PHB) at the router interfaces. The goal of this simulation study is to investigate the likelihood and conditions of this sequence error in an ADNS configuration.
Simulated Topology and Configuration
The simulated configuration was derived from ADNS functional drawings and configuration in [7] , [SI, and [9] . The network architecture is shown in Figure 2 -1.
The scenario was selected to simulate a ship to shore communication from a SHF SATCOMequipped ship to a tactical terminal on the shore. Note that most implementations of TADIL-over-ADNS will include an additional hop to another afloat participant. However the objective of this study is to focus on a single SATCOM hop, illustrating a best case scenario. Each of the dotted lines that connect the two routers in Figure 5 1 represent SATCOM links and model the channel transmission and propagation effects of each. Data rate allocations for ADNS are listed in The data rates shown in Under normal operation of this network, the OSPF routing protocol would select the CA link as the optimal route to the shore terminal and the network would continue to operate with no sequence errors. However the situation that this simulation study investigates is the case where the CA link fades in and out of operation. This forces the muting protocol to select an alternate path (in this case, the DSCSIII link) when the CA link is inoperable. As the CA link comes back online, it is eventually reselected by OSPF as a faster link, causing a vulnerability to message sequence errors. The simulation was configured to execute for ten minutes of simulated time. CA link failures were forced at random times and lasted about 2 minutes each. There were four TADIL messages that were received out of order during the simulation. There were also four periods of failure that occurred for the CA link. Each of the out-of-order messages was received a short time aller the failed CA link became operable. This suggests a vulnerability period for this ADNS configuration, where the system is vulnerable to producing sequence errors if it receives multiple consecutive packets during this time. Figure 2 -2 shows the throughput on the two links that were shared by OSPF. The primuy link in the figure is the CA link, and the secondmy link is the DSCSIII link. For ease of viewing, regular OSPF link state updates and non-TADIL ADNS traffic are not included in this chart. Failures occur when the primary link throughput drops to zero. The figure highlights the four vulnerability periods that occurred when the primary link was activated and selected as the new best link by the OSPF routing protocol.
Results
General Loadsharing
Current implementations of ADNS that utilize OSPF only send data over one channel at any given time, leaving the remaining links idle. Future ADNS upgrades have considered implementing some form of loadsharing across SATCOM links in order to make more efficient use of the aggregate available bandwidth [lo] . Loadsharing would operate in conjunction with QoS, allowing the ship-toshore reachback hop to be viewed as a single channel and still allow QoS PHBs at the channel interface.
The previous study highlighted the dangers of dynamically utilizing different SATCOM links by the routing protocol.
Loadsharing switches transmissions among different llnks in order to balance traffic flows. In both cases, transmitting over links of different channel characteristics may cause messages to anive out-of-order at the destination.
There are different loadsharing implementations that are currently under investigation. This study investigates a general loadsharing algorithm that primarily seeks to balance loading across the ADNS SATCOM links and is unconcerned with packet sequence errors. The study that follows in Section 2.3 examines a loadsharinghouting protocol that is currently under consideration for future ADNS upgrades, the Enhanced Interior Gateway Routing Protocol (EIGW) [ll] . This protocol seeks to reduce packet sequence errors by only selecting well matched links at the cost of load balancing performance. Both protocols implement packet-level loadsharing. Future investigations into session and flow-level loadsharing may also decrease the chances of message sequence errors.
Simulated Topology and Configuration
The simulated topology and configuration was, for the most part, the same as the topology and configuration defined in Section 2.1.1. However in this simulation no link failures were simulated. Equal propagation delays were assigned to all SATCOM links. The C2P generated the same level of traffic with the same highest priority QoS.
A generic loadsharing algorithm was implemented that distributed traffic across each link proportional to its capacity.
Results
Results for this simulation are shown in below: Figure 2-4 shows that 2.3% of all of the TADIL messages that were sent through ADNS were received out of sequence. In addition, the figure shows that all of the sequence errors resulted from TADIL messages being sent through the low data rate UHF and EHF links. This suggests a potential badsharing solution that ignores links with very different channel characteristics. This is investigated in the next section., to their respective capacities. However no message sequence errors occurred throughout the entire simulation.
As a result, a second simulation was executed that transmitted sequential TADIL messages closer together to increase the likelihood of sequence errors, even on links with relatively well matched channel characteristics.
The second simulation was conducted based on the successful results of the first experiment. The use of EIGRP in the first sequence errors that were observed in the simulation in Section 2.2. For this simulation, the TADIL packet generation characteristics were changed from one pcket every 0.2 seconds to two sequential packets every 0.4 aggregate TADIL traffic data rate. However this change error performance under more adverse conditions. Figure Z6 shows the total number of TADIL messages that were received by the destination C2P during the course of the simulation. The figure shows that 12.9% of all messages that were sent were received out of order. In addition, the figure shows that the sequence errors occurred with a fairly constant frequency. . , The previous three simulation studies have assumed that the TADIL traffic will be assigned to a single, high priority traffic class. However there have been some recent investigations into creating multiple DiffServ QoS traffic classes and PHBs for different types of TADIL traffic. The intent of this study is to examine the cases where differing traffic classes and PHBs may cause message sequence errors and to highlight the need for caution and thorough investigation when assigning TADIL message types to different QoS Type of Service (ToS) classes.
Simulated Topology and Configuration
This simulation utilizes the same topology and configuration as in Section 2.2.1. However no loadsharing is implemented and message routes are static during the course of the simulation. Two TADIL messages are generated by the C2P every 0.4 seconds. The first of the two messages is assigned to the BackgroundToS. The second message is assigned to a different ToS for each simulation execution. Non-TADIL traffic from ADNS is not simulated during this experiment. 
Results
Results for the simulation are shown below. Figure 2-7 summarizes the results of 7 simulation executions. Each simulation execution utilized a different ToS for the second of the two generated messages. The figure shows that up to 2.1% of all messages sent to a destination C2P were received out of order and that the error percentage vaned according to the ToS assignment. The only simulation execution that resulted in 0% message sequence errors was when the second message was set to the Background ToS, which is the same ToS as the first message. These results suggest that it is important to assign different TADIL message types to the same ToS class when the information from each message type is related. For examplefire message types should be in the same traffic class as holdfire message types since their received sequence order is very important.
